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It is theoretically clear and may be verified empirically that efficient financial markets can 
make it less necessary for policy to try and offset the welfare effects of labour income risk 
and unequal consumption dynamics. The literature has also pointed out that, since 
international competition exposes workers to new sources of risk at the same time as it 
makes it easier for individual choices to undermine collective policies, international 
economic integration makes insurance-oriented government policies more beneficial as 
well as more difficult to implement. This paper reviews the economic mechanisms 
underlying these insights and assesses their empirical relevance in cross-country panel 
data sets. Interactions between indicators of international economic integration, of 
government economic involvement, and of financial development are consistent with the 
idea that financial market development can substitute public schemes when economic 
integration calls for more effective household consumption smoothing. The paper’s 
theoretical perspective and empirical evidence suggest that to the extent that governments 
can foster financial market development by appropriate regulation and supervision, they 
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Regulatory and tax-subsidy policies play an important role, alongside financial market 
access, in smoothing income and consumption and protecting households from labour 
market and lifecycle risks. The configuration of policies and markets differs across 
countries, and interacts with changing economic circumstances. New types of income 
risk became relevant when industrialization led to increased specialization and 
urbanization made it necessary to replace family- and village-level safety nets with 
trading in financial markets or with collective welfare schemes. The evolution of markets 
and institutions was shaped by political and social factors in each country, which   
featured and still feature different combinations of public and private risk-sharing 
frameworks.  
When and where collective institutions play a predominant role – in the form of 
education and pension schemes, progressive taxation, unemployment and employment 
protection schemes – it is not necessary for households to access markets in order to 
finance human capital accumulation, fund retirement, and smooth out labour income 
fluctuations. In economic systems where access to efficient financial markets makes it 
possible for households to manage income risk with private instruments, conversely, 
there is less need for economic policies to reduce the intensity and frequency of labour 
income shocks or to buffer their implications for household consumption. Differences 
across countries in these respects interact importantly with ongoing changes in the nature 
of risk and in the relative efficiency of private and public instruments. In the post-War 
period, new risks have arisen from deeper international economic integration and related 
processes of deindustrialization in advanced countries (Rodrik, 1998; Iversen and 
Cusack, 2000). Social protection schemes based on youth education and lifelong 
employment lose some of their ability to stabilize labour income in times of heightened 
international competition and intense structural change. 
This paper focuses on interactions between the internationalization of markets, national 
public redistribution schemes, and private financial market development. As pointed out 
by Rodrik (1998), Agell (2002), and others, the risks entailed by international trade and 
specialization may induce more pervasive interference with market-driven income 
distribution processes in more open countries. If the relevant risks can be covered by 
financial market instruments, however, more intense international competition need not 
be accompanied by larger government budgets and more intense redistribution. And 
while economic integration may well increase demand for redistribution in countries 
where financial markets are a poor substitute for government policies, international tax 
competition also makes it difficult to implement collective redistribution policies.  3 
 
Section 1 outlines theoretical interactions between sources of risk and different risk-
sharing frameworks. Private markets are generally unable to provide insurance against 
labour income risks and, to the extent that governments cannot provide costlessly the 
same insurance that markets fail to provide, redistribution policies need to trade-off 
consumption stability and production efficiency. The shape of the relevant trade-off 
depends on structural factors. Among these, the scope of international economic 
interactions affects both the incidence of market-driven income risk, and the power of 
governments to enforce collective schemes in the face of international systems 
competition. Section 2 brings the resulting perspective to bear on differences and changes 
in cross-country and time-series country data on international openness, governments’ 
economic involvement, and financial development. The interaction between these 
features is consistent with the idea that a suitable financial infrastructure is a key 
determinant of a country’s willingness to open its economy to international market 
influences, and forego some of its public policies’ ability to shape citizens’ incomes and 
consumption. The concluding Section 3 discusses implications for policy and for further 
research. 
 
1.  Risk, markets, and redistribution 
Economists are justifiably fond of complete competitive markets as a useful reference 
paradigm. When realizations of risk have different implications for different individuals 
and (because of risk aversion) fluctuations of consumption around a given mean decrease 
welfare, it would be ex ante efficient to arrange for resources to be transferred from lucky 
to unlucky individuals so as to ensure that ex post, after the realization of risk, marginal 
utility varies across individuals in predetermined ways.
2   But economists are also keenly 
aware that, in reality, smoothing the consumption implications of income shocks is very 
difficult across individuals and over time for a given individual. 
1.1 Incentives and information 
Implementation of the “contingent transfers” that would efficiently redistribute risky 
income faces major information and enforcement hurdles, especially in the case of the 
most important and least insurable risk in all household’s life: that of seeing their labour 
income disappear, temporarily or permanently, when product markets turn against their 
occupation or profession. Labour income differences across industries and regions for 
similar workers, and for differently skilled workers within each region and industry, are 
at least partly explained by the fact that mobility towards higher-paying jobs, across 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Bertola, Foellmi, Zweimueller (2006, Ch.8) for an exposition of this perspective, and of 
its limitation. 4 
 
occupations and geographic locations, is costly. Since labour mobility cannot arbitrage 
away job-specific wage differentials, higher volatility of labour demand will then imply 
wage differentials that are not only more volatile, but also more widely distributed at a 
point in time because wage differentials need to be larger, in order to motivate mobility, 
when they are less permanent.
3 Wider and more volatile wage differentials have 
important welfare implications when individual workers cannot rely on private financial 
instruments or collective schemes in order to finance their mobility towards higher-
paying jobs. When labour demand variability needs to be absorbed by individual 
resources, rather than aggregate ones, its trends and fluctuations will be primarily 
reflected in the level and volatility of workers’ consumption. Not surprisingly, in fact, 
empirical earnings and consumption data tracks each other quite closely at the individual 
level, especially at the low end of their distributions (Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Blundell 
and Preston, 1998). 
Much as it would be desirable for households to obtain insurance against job loss, private 
markets cannot supply it as easily as insurance against earthquakes. Job loss, like many 
health problems and other life events, can result from the individual’s own behaviour as 
well as from objective circumstance. To the extent that the former cannot be observed 
and the latter are hard to verify, an insurance contract specifying the circumstances where 
a worker would be entitled to compensation when fired would be exceedingly complex to 
write, and essentially impossible to enforce privately. Workers covered by private 
insurance contracts would not work as hard, and would be fired so much more promptly 
than uninsured workers as to make insurance either unprofitable for the issuer, or so 
inefficient as to be too costly for purchasers.  
Governments have obvious enforcement advantages (and indeed supply law and contract 
enforcement services to market interactions), and may exploit better information about 
individual circumstances and interactions across agents. When market interactions cannot 
exploit sufficiently broad and reliable information, taxation of lucky individuals and 
payment of subsidies to unlucky ones can potentially fulfil the same need for insurance as 
missing financial contracts. If it does succeed in serving the same purpose that markets 
would pursue, redistribution need not decrease productive efficiency, and may well 
increase it if they encourage risk-taking behaviour. For example, unemployment 
subsidies can allow workers to prolong their search for jobs, and improve the productivity 
of the job they will eventually accept (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). Labour market 
institutions and regulation can perform much the same role as explicit taxation and 
subsidy payments, and may be more easily administered in some countries. For example, 
employment protection legislation can substitute unemployment insurance schemes, and 
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may trigger retraining or severance payments that private markets would not be able to 
fund or enforce (Bertola, 2004).  
But policies would only be able to maximize welfare in much the same unrealistic 
circumstances of perfect information and enforcement that would support perfect and 
complete markets for contingent transfers. Just like real-life markets, so real-life policies 
face serious problems in their attempts to buffer income shocks.  
On the one hand, if political decision processes are charged with implementing 
redistribution, they may do so not for ex post insurance purposes but on an ex ante basis, 
in favour of politically strong groups. Ex ante redistribution may be grounded in shared 
solidarity feelings, but is also influenced by political power and rent seeking, so it is 
generally not equally supported by all individuals. Conversely, the expectation that 
shocks disturbing mean income will be offset by policy improves welfare for all risk-
averse individuals, regardless of their mean income. In practice it is not easy to 
disentangle the two sets of policy motivations and effects, which are pursued by a single 
set of imperfect policy instruments. Implementation of ex ante redistribution cannot rely 
on lump-sum instruments, and that of ex-post redistribution cannot be based on 
realizations of exogenous risk: both have to be defined in terms of observed income, 
which depends on exogenous circumstances as well as on individual effort.  
On the other hand, just as information problems can prevent financial markets from 
providing insurance, so they can imply that policies reduce aggregate production at the 
same time as they share it. As the State does not know all, its policies suffer the same 
incentive effects that prevent private insurance companies from offering insurance 
against bad labour-market luck. Workers will not work as hard to avoid job loss and to 
find new jobs when they are insured against unemployment, making it difficult for 
employers to fire redundant workers stabilizes workers' labour income but also slows 
down labour reallocation towards more productive jobs, thus reducing production and 
profitability. 
The configuration of redistribution-motivated institutions is different across countries, in 
ways that largely reflects the historical development of Nation-States. In European 
countries, legislation meant to endow workers with some bargaining power and to insure 
them against health, unemployment, and old-age hazards was introduced at times of 
actual or feared social unrest, in Bismarck’s industrializing Germany or in Lord 
Beveridge’s post-War United Kingdom.  The institutional structure of labour markets and 
welfare schemes is  distinctively different not only across the US, Japan, and Europe as a 
whole, but also across countries within Europe, where labour market policies play 
different roles in different Welfare State models (Bertola et al., 2001). Scandinavian 
countries offer universal welfare benefits and feature a very important role for active 6 
 
labour market policies (including job creation in the public sector), while the 
Bismarckian model of continental European countries such as France and Germany is 
firmly rooted in labour market regulation, with centralized wage determination and 
stringent employment protection legislation, and also assigns an important role to 
mandatory pension, health, and unemployment insurance programs administered by 
government entities.  
The Beveridgian model of the United Kingdom features comparatively light regulation of 
wage determination and employment relationships and general entitlement to safety-net 
benefits financed by general taxation, rather than insurance payouts financed by 
contributions. In the Anglo-Saxon welfare states, collectively administered schemes do 
not address insurance needs. This leaves room for development of private financial 
markets which, as pointed out by Bertola and Koeniger (2007a), can make it less 
necessary to rely on government redistribution in order to smooth consumption in the 
face of individual-specific shocks. Some of the relevant cross-country heterogeneity is 
related to the effectiveness of their legal and administrative frameworks in supporting 
markets and administrations. A large and influential, if controversial, body of work views 
market development and regulatory interferences as determined by countries’ “legal 
traditions,” as defined and measured by La Porta et al (1998). While the flexible 
Common Law system of Anglo-Saxon countries appears more suitable to support private 
contractual relationships, the code-based systems of Continental European and other 
countries influenced by the French legal tradition seem to stifle development of private 
markets, while perhaps fostering relatively efficient bureaucratic administration of 
government schemes.  
 
1.2 International risk and policy competition 
Over time, the breadth and intensity of international economic interactions has tended to 
increase, driven by improvements of transportation and communication technologies, and 
to improve the overall efficiency of production patterns. The speed of economic 
integration differs across countries and periods, however, because policy and politics 
have to deal with its implications for within-country income distribution and for the   
feasibility of redistribution.  
In theory, deeper international integration may or may not influence the instability of 
relative demand across jobs (industries, regions, and occupations). More intense product 
market competition increases the responsiveness of labour demand to labour costs, and 
shocks have sharper wage and employment implications when employers enjoy access to 
wider international substitution possibilities. Shocks do also occur within closed 
economies, however, and while barriers to international economic interactions protect 7 
 
domestic producers from foreign shocks, they also clog channels of adjustment to local 
shocks. Income fluctuations need not be larger in a closed economy than those occurring 
in an economy open to the influence of foreign shocks that are imperfectly or negatively 
correlated to those that originate in the domestic economy. 
The relationship between economic integration and labour income risk is therefore an 
empirical issue. On the basis of observable outcomes, it is not easy to assess whether 
integration increases labour income instability (see OECD, 2007), as it occur 
simultaneously with other relevant phenomena, and is not exogenous. Interesting 
relationships can however be detected between trade exposure and labour income 
volatility in micro data (Krebs, Krishna, and Maloney, 2005). There is also even clearer 
survey evidence that individuals do perceive international economic integration as a risk 
factor, as their attitudes towards it are related to their personal and economic 
characteristics in theoretically sensible ways (see Mayda, O’Rourke, and Sinnott 2007). 
For example, low skill workers more strongly oppose immigration than high skill 
workers in countries where immigrant flows are more markedly less skilled than 
residents. More interestingly for this paper’s purpose, there is evidence of significant 
interactions between the generosity of welfare state provisions and attitudes towards 
immigration. In advanced countries with more generous welfare schemes, high-skill 
individuals are less favourable to immigration, quite possibly because, as relatively high-
income taxpayers, they feel that inflows of relatively poor individuals will increase 
welfare system financing needs. As to the relationship between economic integration and 
labour income risk,  more intense foreign direct investment activity is associated with 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the respondent’s present job security in the British 
worker survey analysed by Scheve and Slaughter (2004), who find that  variation over 
time within a sector of indicators of FDI activity, controlling for the aggregate cycle, has 
an effect on perceptions of job security that is statistically very significant and roughly 
twice as strong as that of worker unionization, education, and income. 
If labour and product markets generate more labour income risk as they widen across 
national borders, and financial markets remain unable to smooth that risk’s implications 
for individual consumption, more intense international trade should be associated with 
more pervasive regulation and redistribution (Rodrik, 1998). But while international 
economic integration increases the desirability of redistribution, it also makes it more 
difficult to implement. National tax policies face more elastic disappearance of tax bases 
when potential taxpayers can move income to other constituencies, rather than just reduce 
labour supply. National subsidy policies are more expensive when they attract recipients 
from other constituencies, and labour market institutions similarly lose some of their 
power to shape labour incomes as markets become more powerful, collective bargaining 
is undermined by employers’ better outside options, and the negative productivity impact 8 
 
of employment protection has more pronounced effects on internationally mobile 
investments.  
When factors can be substituted in production across countries’ borders, and prices and 
costs have stronger effects in more competitive markets, then not only product market 
shocks have stronger effects on wages or employment, but also policies interfering with 
laissez faire labour market outcomes elicit stronger market reactions. International 
competition in product and labour markets and access to cross-border tax arbitrage make 
it more important and easier for private agents to try and avoid the cost implications of 
taxation. If market interactions across the borders of policy-making entities can work 
around policy constraints, uncoordinated policy interventions cannot effectively bind 
individual choice, and regulatory competition across countries’ borders threatens the 
effectiveness of policies that need to rely on compulsory rules based on collective rather 
than individual choices.  
Policies are weakened when international economic relationships offer opportunities to 
opt in and out of redistributive schemes. But as long as policy addresses economic and 
political problems left unsolved by imperfect markets interactions, then barriers to 
economic interactions across the boundaries of political constituencies are natural 
elements of policy intervention packages. Just as economic integration creates new 
sources of risk for producers and households (and more open countries have historically 
tended to have somewhat larger government budgets), it also makes it more costly or 
impossible for collective schemes to provide effective protection against those risks. 
Thus, international economic integration affects both the demand and supply of social 
protection by national policy frameworks (Agell, 2002). Which is the stronger effect 
depends on a variety of factors which may differ across countries. Among these, it is 
interesting to consider those that also influence the accessibility and efficiency of 
household financial instruments.  
 
2.  Openness, government, and finance in country panel data 
 
Social policy should play a smaller role when and where weaker safety nets are needed, 
for example because financial markets can play much the same role, or when its 
implementation is difficult, for example because international competitiveness 
considerations make its  efficiency costs less affordable. This perspective can offer a 
useful interpretation of differences across countries and changes over time of social 
policy, international economic integration, and financial development. To the extent that 
financial markets allow individuals to pool and offset risk, they reduce the negative 
welfare implications of income uncertainty. Thus, better financial markets can be 9 
 
expected to be associated with less support for tax and subsidy policies meant to decouple 
disposable income from market outcomes, and for policies meant to interfere with market 
outcomes so as to reduce the width and frequency of labour income instability.  
The relevant relationships between these aspects and underlying structural and political 
factors are intricate, and the limitations of available data make it impossible to specify 
and estimate structural parameters and causal relationships. The evidence can at most 
provide a descriptive picture of interactions between three relevant dimensions – risk, 
redistribution, and financial development – that are poorly measured and jointly 
endogenous to underlying, largely unobservable country-specific and time-varying 
factors.  
The extent and character of observed redistribution, as discussed above, reflects on 
administrative efficiency and on political tensions and decision processes, as well as on 
the desire to offset the ex post consumption fluctuations induced by uninsurable shocks 
stemming from international competition and other individual income determinants. 
International economic integration is driven both by technological improvements that 
make it increasingly less costly to ship goods and transmit information across countries, 
and by policy choices as regards trade and factor-movement liberalization. Thus, 
opposition to economic integration can be explained by its interactions with redistribution 
policies and with other instruments of collective choice which aim at goals beyond reach 
of imperfect market interactions.  
As to measurement, the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (or “Openness”) may – as in 
earlier contributions – serve as a proxy for individual-specific risk. But it is far from 
trivial to define and measure financial markets’ completeness and efficiency on a 
comprehensive basis. One would ideally want to use information as to the dynamics of 
marginal utilities (or consumption) across individuals within potentially integrated 
economies, but no suitable internationally comparable data are available. Some limited 
information is available regarding the magnitude and changes of overall income or 
consumption inequality across countries and over time, but the theoretical link between 
such statistics and financial markets is tenuous. Theoretical considerations (see Bertola, 
Foellmi, and Zweimueller,  2006) and what empirical evidence can be gathered from  
available data (see Clarke, Xu, Zou, 2003; Bonfiglioli, 2005) suggest that financial 
market development is not monotonically related to inequality outside the unrealistic 
limit case of perfect and complete markets. Liquidity constraints and decreasing returns 
to investment lead to income convergence, while borrowing and lending opportunities 
foster divergence across individuals as uninsurable permanent-income shocks lead to 
equally permanent changes in assets; and, by making it easier to undertake risky 
investments, access to loans and stocks can imply wider ex post income differences 
across investors. 10 
 
To assess interactions between openness and redistribution and financial markets’ 
structure and development, it can be instructive to inspect the evidence viewing 
government policies as the left-hand side variable in simple regressions where the 
explanatory variable include not only openness, as in Rodrik (1998), but also financial 
market variables. The most relevant features of financial markets are those that allow 
individuals to smooth consumption over time in the face of both expected income 
dynamics and unexpected shocks, such as consumer credit facilities and stock-market 
access. While these differ markedly across countries and over time (see Bertola, Disney, 
and Grant, 2006; Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2003), comparable data on the most 
relevant aspects are too scarce for the purpose of even descriptive statistical analysis. 
Accordingly, the regressions below exploit broader, but more readily available indicators 
of credit market development as a relevant and observable proxy for the phenomena of 
interest.  
 
1.2 Cross-country patterns 
To inspect the influence of openness and financial development on government’s 
interference with market-determined income distribution, consider first the cross-
sectional regressions in Tables 1-3. The first two columns reproduce for the large Penn 
World Tables sample of countries, on a 1990-2003 average basis, Rodrik’s (1998) basic 
result: in countries where imports and exports are a larger proportion of aggregate 
income, also the government’s share of GDP is larger.
4 This remains true when 
controlling for Population (insignificantly positive) and for GDPpc, i.e. real per capita 
income, which after controlling for openness shows a negative partial correlation with 
government’s share of income.  
Consider next patterns of co-variation between these variables and financial development 
indicators. A variable measuring credit extended by deposit banks is more widely 
available than broader and perhaps more appropriate measures of total private credit; 
available data do not include narrower household-oriented credit measures. For 135 of 
the 184 Penn World Table countries, at least partial data are available during the 1990-
2003 period for a Credit indicator (see the Appendix for data definitions and sources). In 
column (3), Table 1 reports column (2)’s regression results for this restricted sample, 
finding that the relationship between Openness and government consumption is even 
stronger. Column (4) shows that credit (measured as a log ratio to GDP) is positively 
                                                 
4 The regressions, as in Rodrik (1998), are specified in logarithmic terms. Other functional forms 
do not alter the pattern of coefficient signs and significances in this and all other tables, but tend 
to yield worse overall fit. 11 
 
associated with Openness (after controlling for Population and GDPpc, both of which 
also have positive and significant coefficients).  
Columns (5) and (6) proceed to insert the Credit variable in the regression relating 
government consumption and Openness. In the linear specification (5), Credit has no 
impact on government consumption, and leaves the other coefficients unchanged. But 
when Credit is entered both linearly and as an interaction with Openness, the coefficients 
are more significant, and the interaction is negative. This is qualitatively consistent with 
the idea, discussed in Section 1, that financial markets can substitute government 
schemes in addressing workers’ need for insurance in the face of labour income risk: in 
these data, government expenditure is more positively affected by Openness in countries 
that (after controlling for size and income) display relatively small volumes of credit.  
Credit, all else equal, should be negatively related to structural factors that make it 
difficult to access financial markets in such countries. But the volume transacted on the 
credit market, as on any other market, depends on demand factors as well as on supply 
factors. To the extent that credit reflects the degree of heterogeneity across individuals 
income histories (Iacoviello, 2006), and income shocks depend on openness because 
trade and specialization imply stronger income risk for producers within each country, 
financial market volume data are jointly determined with Openness indicators. To try and 
disentangle supply factors from these and other demand factors (also influenced by 
welfare state and labour market features), the last three regressions reported in Table 1 
exploit a credit information index, CredInfo (see the Appendix for definition and source). 
Along with property rights enforcement, information is a key element of financial 
markets’ infrastructure (Jappelli and Pagano, 2006), and of their ability to manage 
income risk with private contracts market rather than government instruments. It is 
interesting to find in column (7) that the coefficient of CredInfo as a determinant of 
government consumption is indeed negative, and more significant than that of Credit; in 
column (8), that the pattern of CredInfo main and interaction coefficient signs is again 
consistent with substitutability of financial market improvements and larger governments 
in the face of deeper internationalization; and in column (9) that when CredInfo is used as 
an instrument for credit volume in the 127 observations where both variables are 
available – attempting to isolate its supply-side determinants from demand-side ones that 
also influence government spending – the coefficient of Credit is more negative and more 
significant that in column (5), where credit volume was completely irrelevant. 
Government’s GDP share is available for a very wide sample of countries, but is of 
course a poor measure of the income-stabilization and consumption-smoothing 
government activities that may become more important in more open economies and be 
addressed instead by financial market development. For OECD countries, arguably better 
indicators are available for both public management of risk (detailed spending categories 12 
 
from the OECD Social Expenditure Database) and the efficiency of financial market 
(lending-borrowing interest margins and LTV indicators of maximum borrowing limits 
on housing purchases).
5   
Before running regressions similar to those of Table 1 with these alternative indicators, it 
is useful to check whether and how the results of Table 1 specification’s change when the 
OECD restricted sample is used. Table 2 shows that across OECD countries, as was also 
the case in the Rodrik (1998) sample, there is very little evidence of a relationship 
between Openness and government size. The bi-variate correlation is sizable and 
significant in column (1), but is already insignificant when Population and GDP per 
capita are controlled for in column (2). And it all but vanishes when Credit – which is 
highly correlated with GDP per capita in column (3) – and Credit’s interaction with 
Openness are included in column (5). Like in Table 1, the negative sign of the 
Openness*Credit significant interaction coefficient, and of the large and imprecisely 
estimated IV coefficient in column (6), are qualitatively consistent with better developed 
financial markets reducing the Government-size effect of increased openness.  
The smaller and familiar sample of OECD countries also makes it possible to assess 
informally the patterns of variation in the relevant data. Figures 1-3 display scatter plots 
for core OECD countries where more than one LTV observation is available.
6 In Table 3, 
where the dependent variable is a measure of Public Social Expenditure (see the 
Appendix for definition), the first four columns largely deliver a message similar to that 
of the corresponding columns of Table 2.  Openness is not strongly related to Public 
Social Expenditure once country size and income are controlled for. As shown in Figure 
1, there is a clear upward-sloping relationship between GDP per capita and Public Social 
Expenditure as a share of GDP. Since relatively large countries (such as Japan and the 
United States) are negative outliers to that relationship, while small Scandinavian 
countries spend even more than their income would predict, Population enters with a 
negative sign in column (2) of Table 3. The strength of the bi-variate relationship 
between Openness and Public Social Expenditure, shown in Figure 2 and column (1) of 
Table 3, is halved by inclusion of income levels and Population.  
                                                 
5  Public social expenditure and interest rate margins are available for 27 countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States).  LTV 
information is not available for 6 of these countries (Czech Republic, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, 
Poland, Switzerland); only one LTV observation is available for Turkey. 
6 The regressions in Table 1 and in columns (1-4) of Table 2 include other OECD countries as 
well. Statistical significance is affected by inclusion of those observations but the qualitative 
pattern of coefficient sign and sizes is similar for the smaller and more easily plotted sample 
shown in the figures. 13 
 
The positive correlation between income levels and social spending ratios should not 
necessarily be read as a causal relationship running from the latter to the former. It is 
possible for taxes and subsidies to perform efficiency-enhancing roles that are beyond 
reach of imperfect and incomplete financial markets, but the evidence is consistent with 
Section 1.1’s more pessimistic view if countries are exogenously different in their ability 
to produce income at the aggregate level and the negative side effects of social policy are 
less serious for countries that are richer to begin with for geographical and historical 
reasons, such countries may well implement more extensive redistribution than poorer 
ones where strenuous effort is absolutely necessary. The negative coefficient of 
population size may be interpreted in terms of the administrative difficulties and 
additional distortions entailed by social policies when countries are highly heterogeneous, 
perhaps in terms of ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al, 2004).  
To the extent that Population and real GDP per capita control for these determinants of 
social policy supply and demand, it is possible to assess the additional role of risk factors 
and financial development in shaping each country’s  willingness and ability to open up 
internationally and/or to engage its government in redistributive activities. There is no bi-
variate relationship between Int.Margin and Public Social Expenditure (see Figure 3), nor 
there is any partial correlation between those variables after controlling for other standard 
determinants in column (3) of Table 3. When the interaction between Openness and 
Int.Margin is included among the regressors in column (4), however, Openness per se 
appears to be irrelevant to the intensity of social policies. What is associated with larger 
social spending is instead the combination of openness and poor financial market access, 
as large spreads between households’ asset and liability return rates make saving and 
borrowing unattractive and expose consumption to large fluctuations if income shocks 
are larger or more frequent.  
The same interpretation of cross-country facts is supported, in columns (6) and (7), by the 
opposite pattern of signs for the loan-to-value indicator (LTV, which is more positive in 
more accessible financial markets) and its interaction with Openness. While the 
coefficients of loan-to-value (measured in percentage points) are not statistically 
significant in column (7), they tell a quantitatively interesting story. The average 1990s 
LTV observations range between 69% and 102% (for Italy and New Zealand, 
respectively; see Figure 4 to get a sense of other values). As the LTV varies between 
these values, the estimated total effect of Openness on Public Social Expenditure ranges 
from 0.32, which is almost as large as the bi-variate regressions coefficient of column (1), 
to essentially zero (0.05 for the United States 94% LTV, and -0.03 for the United 




1.2 Changes over time 
Tables 4-6 report regressions similar to those of the previous tables, aimed at 
characterizing relationships between Openness, financial market development, and 
government activity. To focus on within-country dynamic developments rather than on  
cross-country patterns, all regressions include dummies, so that the results are not 
influenced by any (observable, or unobservable) source of variation that is constant over 
time and only varies across countries. Since the Cred.Info index is only available for very 
recent years, its information is essentially cross-sectional and cannot be exploited in these 
specification, and the sample is restricted throughout to countries with at least two LTV 
observations.  
The message of the data is similar in some respects, interestingly different in others. 
Table 4 estimates a shallow (but significant) positive relationship between Openness and 
government consumption over time across the broadest available sample of countries, 
also after controlling for Population and income per capita dynamics. But the relationship 
is sufficiently weak to become statistically insignificant in the regressions of column (3), 
which restrict the sample to observations with non-missing Credit information. Column 
(4) shows that Credit is strongly positively related to GDP per capita over time, as was 
the case in the cross-section estimates, and has an insignificant partial correlation with 
Openness. In column (5) Credit is positively (and GDP per capita negatively) associated 
with Government’s share of GDP, and its inclusion in the regression makes Openness 
insignificant. Finally, and most interestingly, we see in column (6) that the interaction 
between Credit and Openness changes has a significant negative coefficient. Once again, 
development of financial markets appears to lessen the need for government economic 
involvement in the face of increased openness.  
Retracing the cross-sectional specification steps, Table 5 shows a similar pattern for 
regression coefficients estimated on the smaller sample of OECD countries with at least 
two LTV observations (the results are broadly similar for the whole OECD sample of the 
cross-sectional regressions in Table 2, that also includes Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Iceland, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey). While larger Openness had a positive 
uncontrolled association with government consumption in the wider sample, its partial 
correlation with Public Social Expenditure is consistently negative in the OECD sub-
sample. Differences in credit dynamics, however, are not as pronounced and informative 
within developed countries as to yield significant interaction coefficients in column (5). 
Fortunately, more detailed and relevant indicators of financial market development are 
available for these countries.  
Table 6 reports regressions on the same sample that exploit the information in Public 
Social Expenditure, interest differential, and loan-to-value dynamics within each country. 15 
 
To convey a sense of the data’s shape and of the phenomena driving the results, Figures 5 
and 6 display the data graphically, at 5-year intervals, focusing on a familiar subset of 
advanced countries. The bi-variate association between Openness and Public Social 
Expenditure is negative on a within-country basis, as shown in Figure 5. And throughout 
all specifications of Table 6, Openness and Public Social Expenditure are negatively 
related in the OECD sample along when country dummies are included. In contrast to 
Agell’s (2002) reading of evidence of a positive relationship between changes in 
openness and in employment protection legislation, this finding may indicate that 
redistribution policy does become so much more difficult in more open economies as to 
more than compensate higher demand  for social protection – or, in a milder 
interpretation, that the same structural and policy changes that increase openness 
differently across countries also affect social policy in the opposite direction.  
Columns (5-7) of Table 6 display similarly intriguing patterns as regards co-variation of 
Openness and Public Social Expenditure ratios with indicators of financial development. 
In column (5), where the regression controls for Int.Margin and its interaction with 
Openness, the latter’s main effect is a sharply negative determinant of public social 
expenditure, and the interaction is significantly positive. This may indicate that, in 
situations where efficient financial markets ease borrowing and lending, openness implies 
a more pronounced decline in (less necessary, and more distorting) public redistribution 
programmes. 
Figure 6 displays observations for advanced countries, at 5-year intervals. It shows that 
the bi-variate correlation between the loan-to-value ratio and openness changes is 
positive. This agrees with the notion that openness makes financial market development 
more necessary, or that financial market development makes openness more palatable: 
while the direction of causality is of course unclear, either or both channels of interaction 
are likely at work in the data, along with other factors that may explain why in the 
regression of column (6) controlling for Population and GDP per capita deprives the LTV 
of all significance. But the loan-to-value main effect and interactions that were not 
significant (though with the right sign pattern) in cross section estimates are very 
significant along the time series dimension in column (7). And while in cross section the 
relationship between openness and government was estimated to be either positive or 
absent, depending on financial market development, in time series it is consistently 
negative. The variation in the implied relationship between Openness and Public Social 
Expenditure is again large, ranging from over -0.5 for the 2001 values of LTV deviations 
from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and New Zealand country means, to only -0.15 
for the 1986 LTV deviation observed in Italy.  
The insignificant cross-sectional estimates may be due to the limited range of the 
independent variable: within this set of countries, financial markets have developed faster 16 
 
in laggard countries, and the convergence pattern implies that averages are not as sharply 
different as early observations. It may also indicate that uncontrolled country 
characteristics influence choices of openness and social policies in such a way as to 
preserve within-country income redistribution. The high significance of the LTV main 
effect and Openness interaction along the time-series dimension may similarly be 
spurious in yearly data regressions. Inclusion of contemporaneous GDP aims at 
controlling for cyclical influences, but the relationship between openness and public 
spending may be driven by short-run fluctuations as well as by the trends represented by 
interpolated LTV observations. While dynamic specifications of the relevant relationship 
are beyond the scope of this paper (and of available data), it is interesting to find that 
within-country panel estimates offer statistically strong evidence that changes in LTV, 
openness, and government spending are quantitatively important, and vary over time in 
ways consistent with Section 1’s perspective.  
 
3.  Policy implications and further research 
This paper’s broad perspective views observed redistribution policies as a result of the 
interplay between the factors determining their desirability (labour income uncertainty 
and the ability of markets to smooth its consumption implications) and of factors 
determining their effectiveness (the government’s ability to exploit superior information 
and enforcement, and the markets’ ability to circumvent regulation and amplify policies’ 
undesirable side effects). The insights discussed in Section 1 suggest that 
internationalization of economic relationships may amplify market risks at the same time 
as it makes it increasingly difficult for governments to provide households with insurance 
against them and increasingly important for households to access private financial 
markets. The simple evidence discussed in Section 2 supports the empirical relevance of 
this policy prescription, especially for developing countries, but also for those among 
industrialized countries that have more extensively relied on taxes, subsidies, and 
regulation.  
Across countries, the data display patterns of increasing openness, decreasing 
government redistribution activity, increasing depth and efficiency of credit markets.   
Along the time series dimension, and especially in developed countries, the implications 
of openness or concurring exogenous developments for income risks and the desirability 
of redistribution policies appear to be more than offset by the increasing difficulties of 
operating them. A possible interpretation of the evidence views globalization trends, 
driven by technological and multilateral trends beyond individual countries’ control, as a 
weakening factor for governments’ power to control market-driven income distribution. 
Shrinking public budgets naturally increase demand for private financial services, and 
increase the need for appropriate regulation and suitable legal frameworks to ensure that 17 
 
demand is met by adequate supply in private financial markets. Accordingly, 
governments should face globalization challenges by strengthening their economies’ 
financial infrastructure, so as to allow private contractual relationships to smooth the 
consumption implications of income flows destabilized by increased specialization and 
foreign-origin shocks.  
While improving financial market infrastructures is not costless, it should be given high 
priority in countries where economic integration entails new risks and, at the same time, 
makes it difficult to operate redistribution policies. From this perspective, the United 
Kingdom's financial market liberalization and development is consistent with that 
country’s experience of public policy and labour market reforms in the 1980s (Koeniger, 
2004), and it is not surprising to find that individuals whose age and income 
circumstances make it desirable to borrow are more keenly in favour of redistribution in 
countries where credit supply is relatively constrained (Bertola and Koeniger, 2007a). 
Further empirical work should adopt more suitable dynamic specifications than those of 
this paper. It could bring a similar approach to analyse the relationship between openness 
and wage-setting and employment regulation, along the lines of Agell’s (2002) 
perspective on labour market institutions as a risk-management device, and follow Lo 
Prete (2007) in relating within-country income redistribution devices to country-level 
consumption and income dynamics.  
It would be very interesting and should be possible to go beyond empirical correlations, 
which sensibly indicate that private and public contingent redistribution and insurance 
schemes are substitutable to each other, and model how the choice between the two is 
driven by underlying structural and historical factors affecting their relative efficiency in 
pursuing politically desirable goals. It is both very important and extremely difficult to 
assess the extent to which private/public substitution can be endogenously driven by such 
trends as increasing internationalization of market interactions. It is important, because 
while globalization trends would be self-sustaining if they lead to development of 
efficient private financial markets at the same time as they crowd out public schemes, 
they would sow the seeds of their own demise if they are perceived to force unpalatable 
risk on citizens of countries whose inefficient financial markets cannot shelter them as 
effectively as trade and government protection used to.  
And it is difficult, because the data cannot shed much light on structural relationships 
between exogenous conditions and endogenous policy relationships. In order to detect 
patterns of statistical causality the literature has focused on persistent influences of 
ancient conquests and colonisations on countries’ legal frameworks and institutional 
developments.  As discussed in Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), historical 
legacies are useful as instrumental variables for the empirical purpose of identifying and 
assessing the role of exogenous factors, but countries are not condemned by history. To 18 
 
the extent that historically determined financial market development can substitute 
private to public provision of insurance and savings vehicles, policy actions aimed at 
making financial markets more easily accessible and more efficient may be a key 
condition for economic integration to be welfare-enhancing and politically acceptable.  
Relevant formal modelling should focus on the interplay of information problems with 
determinants of financial market efficiency (such as legal traditions in La Porta et al, 
1998) and of policy effectiveness (such as “civicness” indicators constructed from survey 
information in Algan and Cahuc, 2005). Bertola and Koeniger (2007b) propose a simple 
model of an economy where unobservable effort and moral hazard problems hamper both 
private markets’ and government policies’ consumption-smoothing role, which may be 
used to characterize how borrowing constraints, market transaction costs, and policy 
administration costs may shape the trade-off between insurance, efficiency, and the 
relative importance of private and collective smoothing instruments. Bringing this 
perspective to bear on such cross-country panel information as that discussed in this 
paper, it might be possible empirically to detect relationships between underlying 
structural features of countries (such as their degree of political and perhaps ethnic 
cohesion), trends affecting the desirability and feasibility of public policies (such as those 
driven by the technological and multilateral liberalization factors underlying increasing 




APPENDIX: Data definitions and sources 
CredInfo is the Credit Information index downloadable from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
site, meant to measure “The depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, 
accessibility and quality of credit information available through either public or private credit 
registries.” It is constructed as follows from data defined and documented in Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer (2007). A score of 1 is assigned for each of the 6 features of the credit information 
system: (1) Both positive (for example, amount of loan and on-time repayment pattern) and 
negative (for instance, number and amount of defaults, late payments, bankruptcies) credit 
information is distributed (2) Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. (3) Data from 
retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial institutions are distributed. (4) More than 2 
years of historical data are distributed. (5) Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are 
distributed. (6) By law, borrowers have the right to access their data. The index ranges from 0 to 
6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public 
registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.  
Credit is the logarithm of variable pcrdbgdp “Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP” 
from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset (Revised: Jan 17, 2007), as defined and 
documented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine (2001). 
GDPpc is variable cgdp "Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita" from the Penn World Tables 
6.2, divided by 1000 (hence measured in thousands of 2000 US$). 
Government is variable cg "Government Share of CGDP" from the Penn World Tables 6.2. 
Int.Margin  is the difference between lending and borrowing rates at commercial banks, variable 
netintmargin “Net Interest Margin” from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset (Revised: 
Jan 17, 2007), as documented in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine (2001). 
LTV  is the maximum loan to value ratio (in percentage points) for mortgages, interpolated from 
data available on or around 1976, 1984, 1994, 2001 from Jappelli and Pagano (1994); Chiuri and 
Jappelli (2003), Maclennan et al. (1998). 
Openness is the logarithm of the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, variable openc "Openness 
in Current Prices" from the Penn World Tables 6.2. As in the original Rodrik regressions, the 
sample excludes observations (for Hong Kong and Singapore) where this variable exceeds 200%. 
The results are very similar when those observations are included, or when variable openk 
"Openness in Constant Prices" is used instead of openc. 
Population is variable pop "Population" from the Penn World Tables 6.2, divided by 1000 (hence 
measured in millions). 
Public Social Exp. is the logarithm of the sum in percent of GDP of the following data from the 
OECD 1986-2001 Public Social Expenditure database: 3.Incapacity Related Benefits 4.Health 
5.Family 6.Active Labour Market Policies 7.Unemployment 8.Housing 9.Other, including social 
assistance. (Only 1. Old age and 2.Survivors are excluded from total Public Social Expenditure.)  
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Globalization of Production” American Journal of Political Science 48:4 662-674. Table 1. Cross-country relationship between openness, credit, and government consumption share of GDP: Worldwide sample 
 



















Openness  0.1882  0.2384  0.2761  0.3703  0.2779  0.2097  0.2741  0.3877  0.3963 
 3.19  3.91 
 
4.35  2.91  4.46 2.58 4.28 3.08 3.38 
Population    0.0002  0.0004  0.0016  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0003  0.0009 
    1.28 
 
1.11  2.78  1.12 0.94 2.10 1.88 2.04 
GDPpc    -0.0160  -0.0106  0.0922  -0.0101  -0.0107  -0.0098  -0.0113  0.0187 
    -4.96 
 
-2.99  14.41  -1.90 -2.01 -2.35 -2.63 0.91 
Credit          -0.0048  0.2180      -0.3173  
    
 
   -0.10 0.92      -1.41 
Openness*Credit            -0.0531       
    
 
    -0.95     
CredInfo              -0.0268  0.1397   
    
 
      -1.67 1.17   
Openness*CredInfo                -0.0385   
                              -1.42   
            N   184  184  135  135  135  135  152  152  127 
           r2   0.0616  0.1462  0.1481  0.5652  0.1482  0.1531  0.1690  0.1793  . 
 
Observations are averages over periods where data are available for each country and variable between 1985 and 2003; before computing the 
average, occasionally missing data are interpolated (the results are virtually identical when only available data are averaged). All regressions 
include a constant term. Robust t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. (*) Credit is instrumented with CredInfo. Sample: all countries, 
except those where openness exceeds 200% (Hong Kong and Singapore) and countries where data are missing.  24 
 
Table 2. Cross-country relationship between openness, credit, and government consumption share of GDP: OECD sample 
 













      Openness   0.2514  0.1633  -0.0411  0.1665  0.0586  0.1132 
                2.40 
 
1.15 -0.20 1.15 0.37 0.37 
        Population     -0.0009  -0.0001  -0.0009  -0.0021  -0.0010 
                 
 
-0.99 -0.06 -0.95 -2.38 -0.59 
       GDPpc     -0.0086  0.0856  -0.0153  -0.0147  0.0956 
                 
 
-0.94 9.93 -1.11 -1.08 0.85 
     Credit        0.0778  2.0196  -1.2190 
                 
 
   0.58 2.99 -0.93 
Openness*Credit           -0.4846   
                 
 
    -2.71   
            N   27  27  27  27  27  27 
           r2   0.1734  0.2366  0.7854  0.2430  0.3995  . 
 
Observations are averages over periods where data are available for each country and variable between 1985 and 2003; before computing the 
average, occasionally missing data are interpolated (the results are virtually identical when only available data are averaged). All regressions 
include a constant term. Robust t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. (*) Credit is instrumented with CredInfo. Sample: OECD countries 
included in the OECD social expenditure database.  25 
 
Table 3. Cross-country relationship between openness, intermediation margins, and Public Social Expenditure: OECD sample 
 
















Openness  0.3794  0.1523  0.1504  -0.0509  0.2105  0.1282  1.0754 
 4.41 
 
1.54 1.42  -0.32  0.74  1.02  0.64 
Population    -0.0031  -0.0029  -0.0024  -0.0080  -0.0033  -0.0034 
   
 
-2.88  -2.31  -1.84 -1.63  -4.27 -4.28 
GDPpc    0.0370  0.0338  0.0370  0.1367  0.0441  0.0410 
   
 
3.11  2.10  2.28 1.59  5.49 5.06 
Int.Margin      -1.2738  -39.9544  39.4884     
   
 
  -0.47 -2.10  1.16    
Openness*Int.Margin        9.9738       
                 
 
   2.03      
LTV            0.0034  0.0470 
         1.19 
 
0.64 
Openness*LTV              -0.0109 
           -0.58 
 
N  27  27  27  27  27  21  21 
r2 0.1992  0.6049  0.6074  0.6251  .  0.7606  0.7645 
 
Observations are averages over periods where data are available for each country and variable between 1985 and 2003; before computing the 
average, occasionally missing data are interpolated (the results are virtually identical when only available data are averaged). All regressions 
include a constant term. Robust t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. (*) Int.Margin is instrumented with CredInfo. Sample: OECD 
countries included in the OECD social expenditure database.  26 
 
















Openness  0.0324  0.0456  0.0332  0.0483  0.0307  -0.1075 
  2.07 2.78 0.87  0.66  0.82 -2.16 
Population    -0.0003  -0.0006  0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0005 
    -1.34  -1.43 0.26 -1.44  -1.28 
GDPpc    -0.0109  -0.0094  0.0412  -0.0115  -0.0084 
   -7.52  -5.70  10.74  -6.19  -4.37 
Credit          0.0516  0.3576 
        3.82 2.91 
Openness*Credit            -0.0758 
          -2.59 
N  2750  2750  1840  1840  1840  1840 
r2  0.8802 0.8825 0.8651  0.8933  0.8668 0.8683 
 
All regressions include country dummies. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. The sample includes all available 
observations for the 1986-2001 period.  27 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 Table 5. Within-country relationship between openness, credit, and government consumption share of GDP: OECD sample 
 
 










Openness      -0.1938       -0.0860       -0.2110       -0.0849       -0.0821  
        -6.07         -2.15         -1.45         -2.07         -1.97  
Population                    -0.0038        0.0058       -0.0039       -0.0037  
                      -4.60          2.21         -4.60         -3.01  
GDPpc                    -0.0034        0.0317       -0.0036       -0.0037  
                      -2.50          4.70         -2.16         -2.35  
Credit                                                 0.0042       -0.0386  
                                                   0.23         -0.19  
Openness*Credit                                                               0.0102  
                                                                 0.22  
            N      314     314     298     298     298 
           r2        0.9320        0.9382        0.8040        0.9383        0.9384  
 
All regressions include country dummies. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. The sample includes all available 
observations for the 1986-2001 period.  
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Table 6. Within-country relationship between openness, interest margin or loan-to-value mortgage ratios, and public social 
expenditure: OECD sample 
 














Openness      -0.1117       -0.3449       -0.3259       -0.2031       -0.4764       -0.3261        0.2417  
        -2.17         -4.87         -4.57         -4.11         -4.99         -4.61          2.39  
Population                    0.0083        0.0086        0.0069        0.0056        0.0086        0.0061  
                      4.23          4.46          4.13          2.48          4.46          3.12  
GDPpc                    0.0074        0.0060       -0.0121       -0.0100        0.0061        0.0065  
                      2.60          2.14         -4.60         -3.98          2.22          2.39  
Int.Margin                                             -4.2092      -36.4688                            
                                               -3.61         -3.57                          
Openness*Int.Margin                                                           7.8368                            
                                                             3.14                            
LTV                                                                       -0.0001        0.0286  
                                                                         -0.05          7.54  
Openness*LTV                                                                                    -0.0069  
                                                                                      -7.50  
N     314      314      300      199      199      300     300 
r2       0.8960        0.9077        0.9108        0.9610        0.9632        0.9108        0.9193  
 
 All regressions include country dummies. Robust standard errors are reported below the coefficients. The sample includes all available 
























































GDP real per capita
 
Figure 1: Income levels and social spending in advanced countries. (Logarithm of  real GDP per 
capita and logarithm of public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2003 averages; see 
























































Figure 2: Openness and social spending in advanced countries (Logarithms of  imports+exports and 



























































Figure 3: Intermediation margins and social spending in advanced countries (Banks’ unit interest 
margin and logarithm of public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2003 averages; see 



































Figure  4: Social spending and mortgage loan-to-value ratios in advanced countries (1990-2003 

































































































































Openness (deviations from country means)
 
Figure 5: Social spending and openness in advanced countries (units as in Figure 2; available 
observations of deviations of 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 data from 1986-2001 country-specific 
averages; see Appendix for definitions). 
































































































Openness (deviations from country mean)
 
 
Figure 6: Opennes and loan-to-value mortgage ratio in advanced countries (units as in Figure 4; 
available observations of deviations of 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 data from the 1986-2001 country-
specific averages; see Appendix for definitions). 
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